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THE MAN AND THE MOUNTAIN:
DOUGLAS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM*
DAVID W. LOUISELLt
"i... [T] he kingdom of heaven suffereth violence,
and the violent bear it away."1
What kind of mind and man came to the United States Supreme Court
a quarter of a century ago to wrestle with perhaps the most fundamental,
difficult and pervasive complex of problems ever to face that tribunal? For
the problems of God and Caesar, which at root are the ultimate ones of human
liberty itself, inflame the passions of man and, especially in America's plural-
istic environment, tax his intellect, as few problems can. That it was a mind
gifted by nature to the point of genius, honed to the precisional fineness of
the excellent corporate lawyer, disciplined by intense struggle and labor, in-
formed by exacting and dedicated public service, and possessed of a restless-
ness intolerant of all but the truth or its persistent quest, I submit is docu-
mented in this issue by my colleague.2 That this was a person of vital and
vibrant religious feeling and conviction - one who with William James had
concluded that "we and God have business with each other" - is apparent
from his own largely autobiographical writings. To read Of Men and Moun-
tains 4 is to be reminded of some of the spiritual poetry in Tolstoi or Bernanos
or Merton.
First, there is Faith - the kind that moves the mountains of which
Douglas writes.
One cannot reach the desolate crags that look down on eternal glaciers
without deep and strange spiritual experiences. If he ever was a doubter,
*Discussion of a man's views on religious freedom, more so than most studies, natu-
rally puts the subject in the frame of world events. When Justice Douglas took his oath
on April 17, 1939, 306 U.S. iii, Hitler and Mussolini were dominant. The dissolution of
the British Empire, then only begun, is now all but complete. The war we fought to
anchor us to security's rock has left us instead loose on a precipice. A fourth President
of the United States recently has been assassinated. And despite an affluence that makes
it hard for us to convince our children that there ever was a depression, perhaps a fifth
of our people still live so far outside the mainstream of American life that it may be
said of them, they know "poverty in the Middle East meaning of the word." DOUGLAS,
STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE (Dedication) (1951).
I thank my colleague Albert Ehrenzweig for reading the manuscript and for sug-
gestions.
tElizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Matthew 11:12 (Douay).
2. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence Upon. Corporate and Securities
Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 (1964). As to the intense labor, witness, e.g., simultaneous
practice and teaching at Columbia. Id. at 922.
3. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 516 (Longmans, Green & Co.
ed.) (1958).
4. DOUGLAS, Or MEN AND MOUNTAINS (1950).
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he will, I think, come down a believer. He will have faith. He will know
there is a Creator, a Supreme Being, a God, a Jehovah. He will know
it because otherwise the mind cannot comprehend how life could have
been created out of the inert matter. When he sees the stuff that was
the beginning of life, he will know that it took an omniscient One to
sculpture man; to fashion one who can laugh, and cry, and love; to mold
out of rock a soul that can aspire to the stars and a heart that can sacrifice
all for an idea or a loved one.5
It is faith from his father - a missionary of the Presbyterian church:
I stood in the silence of the gathering night, [coming down Kloochman]
charting my course by it. Then the words my father had spoken came
back: "If I die it will be glory. If I live, it will be grace."
That was his evening star - a faith in a power greater than man. That
was the faith of our fathers - a belief in a God who controlled man and
the universe. It manifested itself in different ways to different people.
It was written by scholars and learned men into dozens of different
creeds. There were sects and schisms and religious disputes. But riding
high above all such secular controversies was the faith in One who was
the Creator, the Giver of Life, the Omnipotent. 6
Nor is Douglas' faith that of one who sees only an aloof God, majestic but
unapproachable, indifferent to the trials and tribulations of petty man. It is a
faith that was born and bred to prayer.
But before many months I relearned to walk, and the frailty which
the disease [infantile paralysis] had caused seemed to pass. Someone
said that the salt water and massages had effected wonders. Mother was
silent awhile and then said, "So did my prayers."'7
And it is faith that reflects this heritage. To acknowledge prayer embarrasses
the son no more than the mother. Remembering a 1913 climb of Mt. Klooch-
man, Douglas writes:
All was silent. A pebble fell from the ledge on which I squeezed. I counted
seconds before it hit 600 feet below with a faint, faraway tinkling sound.
5. Id. at 308.
6. Id. at 329. In DOUGLAS, RussiAN JOURNEY 203 (1956) he stated:
That morning [at Baku] religion seemed to me to be on its way out in Russia.
As I watched the handful of poor people kiss the Bible held by the priest, memories
of my Father and Mother came back to me. Father had given his life to the
Presbyterian Church. Mother was his faithful co-worker. . . .And so at the
end of the service I bought two candles from an aged, shawled lady dressed in
black and lighted them with a prayer for my parents.
But as the days passed and he saw more churches, his opinion that religion in Russia
was dying changed.
I became convinced that religion in Russia will last as long as the Russian people;
that it is as sturdy and enduring as the shawled women and booted men who kneel
before the cross.
Ibid. Unlike some other visitors to Russia, his sense of truth causes him to say:
In all of Russia the campaign against religion is incessant. It starts in the nursery
and kindergarten that are found in every town and factory and on every farm.
Id. at 201.
7. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 31-32.
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Would Doug [his mountain-climbing companion] drop through the same
space? Would I follow? When you fall 600 feet do you die before you
hit the bottom? Closing my eyes, I asked God to help Doug up the wall.8
... On these dark walls in 1913 I had first communed with God. Here
I had felt the presence of a Mighty Force, infinitely beyond man. Here
I had known the strength of unseen hands helping me along ledges.9
But for Douglas religion is more than prayer. It is an understanding of the
world, an orientation to reality, the basis of a personal philosophy, a way
of life.
There are other ways too in which mountains have spiritual values.
When man ventures into the wilderness, climbs the ridges, and sleeps
in the forest, he comes in close communion with his Creator. When man
pits himself against the mountain, he taps inner springs of his strength.
He comes to know himself. He becomes meek and humble before the
Lord that made heaven and earth. For he realizes how small a part of
the universe he actually is, how great are the forces that oppose him.10
It is easy to see the delicate handiwork of the Creator in any meadow.
But perhaps it takes these startling views [Mount Rainier in sight] to
remind us of his omnipotence. Perhaps it takes such a view to make us
realize that vain, cocky, aggressive, selfish man never conquers the
mountains in spite of all his boasting and bustling and exertion. He con-
quers only himself."
Most eloquently, Douglas sees religion as the poetry of life.
I never see the bitterroot blooming among the sage without feeling that
I should take off my hat and stand in adoration at the wondrous skill of
the Creator. I'll always remember the words of the artist who said, "I
have grown to feel that there is nothing more amazing about a personal
God than there is about the blossoming of the gorgeous little bitterroot."' 2
As I mushed along in the fluffy snow, I sensed the silence and solitude
of the mountains in wintertime. There is no movement, no ripple of life
anywhere. On such a morning in a high valley under deep snow man
comes closer to God. This is the solitude of all time. Here man has left
behind the noise and whir of life. He walks as if he were the first arrival.
He finds the inner harmony that comes from communion with the heavens.
He can draw strength from the austere, majestic beauty around him.' 3
There is a universal quality about bread, whatever may be its color
or ingredients. Like air and water and sunshine it is a part of the life
of all peoples. Like the family, it is part of our traditions. Gandhi once
said, "God himself dare not appear to a hungry man except in the form
8. Id. at 318.
9. Id. at 326.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 69.
12. Id. at 50.
13. Id. at 278.
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of bread." Ben Hur Lampman once printed a verse written by an anony-
mous author:
Be gentle when you touch bread
Let it not lie uncared for, unwanted -
Too often bread is taken for granted.
There is such beauty in bread;
Beauty of sun and soil;
Beauty of patient toil;
Wind and rain have caressed it,
Christ often blessed it -
Be gentle when you touch bread.14
But Douglas' religion was not sentimentality, like so much that passes as
religion today. It reflected what was, perhaps, Protestantism's most basic
ethic of duty and individual accountability. As the Justice later wrote, dissent-
ing in the "Blue Law" cases, "The Puritan influence helped shape our con-
stitutional law and our common law as Dean Pound has said: The Puritan
'put individual conscience and individual judgment in the first place.' -15 And
Douglas' religion was concerned with the eschatological.
Man stands here [on Old Snowy] as I imagine he stands on Judgment
Day - naked and alone, judged by the harmony of his soul, by his spiri-
tual strength, by the purity of his heart. 16
Dollars, guns, and all the wondrous products of science and the ma-
chine will not be enough: "This night thy soul shall be required of thee."' 7
Lastly, it should be noted that Douglas is a man not only of religious but
of specifically Christian commitment. For example, in Strange Lands and
Friendly People I8 we observe his sense of longed-for encounter and com-
munion with the fact and person of Christ - the quintessence of the Chris-
tian ethos.
We first saw the Sea of Galilee from a distance. ... The gravelly shores
were covered with smooth pebbles. Many were colored - some flat,
some round. They were the pebbles that were here when Christ walked
these shores. I pocketed a few for a Sunday-school class back home.19
In village after village I saw the same sight; and as I went among these
huts I got a new understanding of Christ at work in this area. I realized
for the first time what Christ the Healer meant. To rise from any sickbed
is a miracle. To rise from a sick bed surrounded by the squalor and stench
of the Middle East without the aid of drugs or science is superhuman.
I appreciated for the first time what hold Christ must have had on the
ordinary people of this area. These disease-ridden folks had no doctors,
no medicines, no hospitals; but He knew how to cure them. They saw
Him make the afflicted whole with a word; and so they worshipped him
14. Id. at 257.
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
16. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 212.
17. Id. at 329.
18. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE (1951).
19. Id. at 220.
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and flocked in multitudes after Him. His deeds were the talk of the
nation. One day the host that followed him was so great they had to let
a sick man down through the roof because the doors were blocked. At
Galilee the audience was so large He had to preach from a boat pushed
out from the shore. It was Jesus the Healer whom they adored. No
wonder there was a great commotion in a city when the word was passed,
"They say that Jesus of Nazareth is come." No wonder the ecclesiastical
powers of that day trembled at the thought of Christ's great popularity.
By their standards a man who had such a hold on people was a dangerous
man, a subversive influence.2
How has such a mind and man tackled the perennial and universal problems
of God and Caesar in America today? One would expect that his starting
point would be fidelity to religious freedom in its furthest reaches. For one
who has seen America from its mountaintops and there breathed its purest
air, would know that its loftiest spiritual ideal is freedom - and that freedom
without freedom of religion is self-contradiction. He would know that as
Judge he must be on constant alert lest the unconscious surreptitiously trans-
late his own convictions into a mandate for others, to the ruin of freedom.
For as Judge, duty may compel one to permit what he detests and to abjure
what he loves. 21 It is therefore consistent to observe Douglas, relatively early
in his judicial career, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,2 writing for the Court a
decision which invalidated a municipal license tax imposed on religious col-
porteurs as a condition of their activities. Proclaiming the preferred position
of freedom of religion, he cast aside the argument that the ordinance was
constitutional because nondiscriminatory. "A license tax certainly does not
acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected
by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters
and peddlers and treats them all alike."
23
20. Id. at 232-33. In the Foreword to his AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY vi (1954) Justice
Douglas says:
There could be as many Anaacs of Liberty as there are philosophies and points
of view. ... My Ahnaae is concerned with the Sermon on the Mount, the United
Nations, workmen's compensation, social security, as well as with habeas corpus
and the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Douglas' latest book, MR. LINCOLN AND THE NEGROES (1963) focuses on Lincoln
as a man of religion (although of no denomination).
21. Cf., CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 37-38 (1956):
The heroism of the judge can be measured by his degree of success in escaping
from the prison of his private life; in spite of an inadequate salary that condemns
his family to poverty he must protect the unlimited riches of others without envy
and according to justice; even when his father's heart may urgently call him to
the bedside of an ailing son, he must remain in the courtroom to listen to the prolix
arguments of attorneys; and in a trial for legal separation he must, if justice
requires it, be ready to decide against the husband even if in his own marital
life he has been unhappy but blameless.
22. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). See also Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 611 (1942)
(Douglas, J., joining in dissenting opinion of Stone, C.J. and concurring in dissenting
opinion of Murphy, J.), judgiment vacated and state courts reversed, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
23. 319 U.S. at 115.
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On the same decision day, Martin v. Struthers 24 held invalid, as applied to
a person distributing religious advertisements, a municipal ordinance forbid-
ding anyone to summon residents to the door to distribute circulars. Justice
Douglas consistently joined in Justice Murphy's concurring opinion: "I
believe that nothing enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right given
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments freely to practice and proclaim one's
religious convictions. '25 Douglas again wrote for the Court in Follet v. Town
of McCormick,26 which held violative of free exercise of religion a municipal
ordinance that imposed a flat license tax on book agents. In that case, the
ordinance had been applied to a Jehovah's Witness preacher who earned his
living by distributing religious tracts in his home town. The Supreme Court
of South Carolina felt that the Murdock case was inapplicable because it in-
'volved itinerant evangelists. However, Douglas explained that the itinerant
nature of the colporteurs' activities in Murdock was mentioned merely to
emphasize the impact of the license tax. He then repeated the broader rationale
of Murdock as controlling: "'[T]he power to tax the exercise of a privilege
is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.' ",27
In Fowler v. Rhode Island,28 the Court, again per Justice Douglas, held
that a municipal ordinance violates the First Amendment when so construed
and applied as to penalize a Jehovah's Witness minister for preaching at a
peaceful religious meeting held in a local park. The ordinance provided that
no person could address a religious meeting in a public park. But other denomi-
nations could and did conduct religious services there. The Court decided
that the city could not prohibit a Jehovah's Witnesses service merely because
it included a sermon. Douglas stated:
[I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or
activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First
Amendment. Nor is it in the competence of courts under our constitutional
scheme to approve, disapprove, classify, regulate, or in any manner con-
trol sermons delivered at religious meetings. Sermons are as much a
part of a religious service as prayers.29
24. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
25. Id. at 149. See also two decisions in which Justice Douglas acquiesced: Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (a state cannot prohibit the distribution of religious
literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517
(1946) (federal government-owned village).
26. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
27. Id. at 576-77. See also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) ; Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943). Cf. Justice Douglas' vote with the majority in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), upholding the defendant's conviction for violation of the
child labor laws by taking her nine-year old ward onto the streets to distribute religious
literature in the evening. For a comprehensive review of the proselyting cases, see Kur-
land, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 36-62 (1961).
28. 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
29. 345 U.S. at 70. In Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), a 5-4 decision, Justice
Douglas, for the Court, held unconstitutional on its face a city ordinance which forbade
the use of sound amplification devices in public places except with permission of the
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In a different kind of case, the reach of Douglas' fidelity to religious liberty
was put to sterner test. Thus in the famous second flag-salute case, West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,30 decided almost a year before the land-
ings in Normandy, the Court, writing through Mr. Justice Jackson, was
content to rest its condemnation of the compulsory salute on the rationale that
... [T] he action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.31
But apparently this did not fully satisfy Justice Douglas, who argued that
the statute failed to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Concurring with Mr. Justice Black,
he emphasized the right to follow a conscience that is predicated on religious
convictions:
Neither our domestic tranquility in peace nor our martial effort in
war depend on compelling little children to participate in a ceremony
which ends in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual condemnation. If,
as we think, their fears are groundless, time and reason are the proper
antidotes for their errors. The ceremonial, when enforced against con-
scientious objectors, more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose,
is a handy implement for disguised religious persecution. As such, it is
inconsistent with our Constitution's plan and purpose.32
In United States v. Ballard 33 followers of the "I Am" movement were
charged with use of the mails to defraud through representations, involving
their religious beliefs, which allegedly were known by them to be false. Justice
Douglas, again writing for the Court, held that the First Amendment's guar-
antee of religious freedom required the trial judge to withhold from the jury
all questions concerning the truth or falsity of such religious beliefs. Moun-
taineer met judge in this significant dialogue:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may
be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made sus-
pect before the law. Many take their gospel from the New Testament.
Chief of Police. The ordinance prescribed no standards for the exercise of his discretion.
The rationale was that it established a previous restraint on free speech. Among the
freedom of religion cases he cited was the famous Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940), where Mr. Justice Roberts had written for the unanimous Court. See also
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), where, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson, convictions for making proselyting speeches in a public park without having
obtained a permit from city officials were reversed. But cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941).
30. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
31. Id. at 642.
32. Id. at 644.
33. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury
charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained
false representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity
of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious
convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile
environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of
religious freedom. The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware
of the varied and extreme view of religious sects, of the violence of dis-
agreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on
which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government
which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's
relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted
the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity
of his religious views. The religious views espoused by respondents might
seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines
are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity,
then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When
the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. 4
And then the mountaineer-judge forthrightly enunciated the American
ideal of non-preferment for any religious denomination and, it would seem,
the ideal of the preferred status for religion qua religion: "The First Amend-
ment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position."3 Did this foreshadow Douglas'
famous statement in Zorach v. Clauson, "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"?"6
34. Id. at 86-87. Douglas has said:
Henry VIII banned the reading of the Bible in church. He decreed that the
common people should not read the New Testament in English. Why? The Bible
contains strong ideas of liberty, ideas that might well make the common folk
restless.
DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 309 (1956).
35. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). See also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), holding that New York legislation which transferred the
administrative control of the Russian Orthodox churches from the Moscow authority to
authorities selected by a convention of the North American churches violates the Free
Exercise Clause. Justice Douglas, while concurring in the Court's opinion, also joined
the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter wherein it is stated:
The long, unedifying history of the contest between the secular state and the
church is replete with instances of attempts by civil government to exert pressure
upon religious authority. Religious leaders have often made gestures of accommo-
dation to such- pressures. History also indicates that the vitality of great world
religions survived such efforts. In any event, under our Constitution it is not
open to the governments of this Union to reinforce the loyalty of their citizens
by deciding who is the true exponent of their religion.
344 U.S. at 124-25. A second case, Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190
(1960), followed Kedroff on the ground that the Free Exercise principles bind the ju-
diciary as well as the legislature. In Kreshik, the New York Court of Appeals had ordered
a retrial on a common law issue assertedly left open by the United States Supreme
Court's invalidation of the statutory basis of the first decision.
36. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in Girouard v. United States 37 which
overruled earlier cases to hold an alien entitled to citizenship who was willing
to take the oath of allegiance and serve in the army as a non-combatant but
was unwilling to bear arms. This required courage, for it was over the vigorous
dissent of as eminent a libertarian as Mr. Chief Justice Stone (the only dis-
senter from the compulsion sustained in the First Flag Salute Case 38), who was
convinced that Congress had adopted the rule of the earlier cases. Douglas'
realism prevailed in the observation that others than bearers of arms also
defend their country: "The nuclear physicists who developed the atomic bomb,
the worker at his lathe, the seamen on cargo vessels, construction battalions,
nurses, engineers, litter bearers, doctors, chaplains - these, too, made essen-
tial contributions. And many of them made the supreme sacrifice. '3 9 He then
proclaims a faith that makes a country worth dying for:
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an
effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the
individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of
Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral power
higher than the State. Throughout the ages, men have suffered death
rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the
State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the
product of that struggle .... 40
In a sense the hardiest test of the reaches of his devotion to religious
liberty arose in Poulos v. New Hampshire 41 - hardiest because its problem
directly concerns the potentials of strife and violence. What had Douglas
really meant when he noted that "Throughout the ages, men have suffered
death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the
State"? In Poulos the Court upheld the state's determination that a city ordi-
nance which forbade the holding of a religious meeting in a city park without
a permit was not invalid on its face. The Court reasoned that the licensing
officials had no discretion as to granting permits, no power to discriminate,
and no control over speech. The Court held that the appropriate remedy for a
Jehovah's Witness claiming arbitrary denial of a license was judicial review
of the licensing official's action; he could not violate the ordinance by holding
the meeting without a license, and defend a criminal charge on First Amend-
ment grounds. This was not good enough for Justice Douglas. He argued
that if denial of the right to speak had been contained in a statute, the defen-
dant would have been entitled to flout the law, exercise his consitutional right
37. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
38. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940).
39. 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
40. Id. at 68. See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (refusal of admission to
the bar of one unable, because of conscientious scruples against wartime service in the
state militia, to take the required oath, did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments) ; Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge concurred in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Black.
41. 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
19641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
to free speech, and when criminally tried, to defend on the ground that the
the law was unconstitutional. "If the citizen can flout the legislature when
it undertakes to tamper with his First Amendment rights, I fail to see why
he may not flout the official or agency who administers a licensing law de-
signed to regulate the exercise of the right of free speech."42
This is dangerous doctrine. It puts society to severe strain in that it tends
to postpone the orderly event, i.e., the judicial process, until after culmination
of the potential disorder. It is doctrine akin to that which, in the area of the
press' notorious conduct in sensational criminal cases, has engendered deci-
sions all but dissipating the judicial contempt power with the result, as Mr.
Justice Jackson warned, of making insecure all rights by jeopardizing the
indispensable one of a fair trial.43 And even as this doctrine strains society,
it puts the individual to gruelling test, for it extends his personal gamble into
the domain of the criminal law's dire threat. But in an area of conscience's
inviolability - such as the right of religious freedom - will history not abide
the mountaineer's conclusion that the risk is worth running?
However, no one has yet been wise enough to devise a formula that per-
mits all avoidance of governmental impingement upon the free exercise of
religion in deed as in thought. That the ideal of Mr. Justice Jackson in
Ballard - "I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this business
of judicially examining other people's faiths" 44 - is not wholly attainable,
or in any event not yet attained, had to be acknowledged by justice Douglas
himself in Cleveland v. United States.45 There, defendants were members of
a Mormon sect known as Fundamentalists who practiced polygamy. They had
plural wives and transported them across state lines. They were convicted of
violation of the Mann Act which makes an offense the transportation in inter-
state commerce of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or de-
bauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." First holding that polygamous
practices are within the act, Justice Douglas for the Court quoted from
Mormon Church v. United States 46 that "The organization of a community
for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism.
42. Id. at 423. Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (curs-
ing a public official is not the exercise of religion) ; but cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951) (defendant's application for a permit to hold religious meetings on New
York City streets unconstitutionally denied, despite his previous denunciation of other
religious beliefs).
43. The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one, but so is the right
to have a calm and fair trial free from outside pressures and influences. Every
other right, including the right of a free press itself, may depend on the ability
to get a judicial hearing as dispassionate and impartial as the weakness inherent
in men will permit.
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 394-95 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See generally
Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1942).
44. 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944).
45. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
46. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
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It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Chris-
tianity had produced in the Western world." 47 Then overruling the contention
that the requisite criminal intent was lacking because defendants were moti-
vated by a religious belief, he said:
That defense claims too much. If upheld, it would place beyond the law
any act done under claim of religious sanction. But it has long been held
that the fact that polygamy is supported by a religious creed affords no
defense in a prosecution for bigamy. . . . Whether an act is immoral
within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by the accused's
concepts of morality. Congress has provided the standard.48
It is much more difficult for a libertarian to be eloquent in overruling a
claim to religious freedom than in sustaining it.
Perhaps the furthest affirmative reach of Justice Douglas' philosophy that
"The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an
authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law
which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights,
conferred by the Creator, which government must respect"49 came in the
four "Blue Law" cases of 1961.50 In two of them appellants had standing to
raise, so far as the First Amendment was concerned, only Establishment
Clause claims ;51 but in the other two the Free Exercise Clause was also
available.52 Thus in Braunfeld v. Brown 53 the merchants complaining of the
Pennsylvania criminal statute which forbade the retail sale on Sunday of
their commodities, were members of the Orthodox Jewish faith. Their argu-
ment, as epitomized by Mr. Justice Stewart, was that "Pennsylvania had
passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious
faith and his economic survival.154 But the Court upheld the law:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious ob-
servance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which
do not impose such a burden.55
The essence of Justice Douglas' long dissent is in the trenchant paragraph
below - a paragraph which immediately follows upon his observation that
47. Id. at 49.
48. 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
49. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 562 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
51. McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 50; Two Guys v. McGinley, supra note 50.
52. Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 50; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
supra note 50.
53. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
54. Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 607.
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most people are as unconscious of their value patterns as they are of the
oxygen they breathe. Does not its simplicity, directness and candor remind
one of the talk of the lumberjack, fisherman, farmer, sailor - or mountaineer?
The issue of these cases would therefore be in better focus if we imagined
that a state legislature, controlled by orthodox Jews and Seventh-Day
Adventists, passed a law making it a crime to keep a shop open on
Saturdays. Wrould a Baptist, Catholic, Methodist, or Presbyterian be
compelled to obey that law or go to jail or pay a fine? Or suppose Moslems
grew in political strength here and got a law through a state legislature
making it a crime to keep a shop open on Fridays. Would the rest of us
have to submit under the fear of criminal sanctions?58
This dissent gains nothing by also invoking the Establishment Clause. It is
adequately supported by principles validly derived from the Free Exercise
Clause. But in Arlan's Dept. Store v. -Kentucky 57 Justice Douglas insists
upon carrying forward Establishment Clause thinking to dissent from the
Court's otherwise unanimous dismissal, for want of a substantial federal
question, of an appeal from convictions for employing persons on Sunday
in violation of a Kentucky statute. Arlan's differed from Braunfeld because
in Kentucky those who actually observe the Sabbath on a day of the week
other than Sunday are exempt from the penal provisions. The Douglas dissent
condemns, in the name of the Establishment Clause, Sunday closing laws
even when the conscience of a minority member is protected by the option of
an alternate day. The extremism of this notion of establishment, at least from
the historical viewpoint, is indicated by the fact that no American court ever
has held a Sunday dosing law unconstitutional - with the single exception
of a California case soon overruled. 55 Justice Douglas thus incurs the danger
of imposing an unjustified limitation upon the religious freedom of the ma-
jority - a danger to which in my opinion he has explicitly succumbed in
other cases, where he reads the Establishment Clause to eradicate all religion
in public life. This view not only lacks historicity but is in the end to under-
mine the First Amendment's primary purpose, protection for the free exer-
cise of religion. For what happens to freedom of religion if, for example,
government does not make available to isolated military personnel or incar-
cerated prisoners the services of chaplains? What happens to it if a public
park, open generally to civic and community events, is closed to religious
activities because government cannot aid religion? The conclusion seems
inescapable that Justice Douglas, at one time our strongest judicial protector
56. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 565 (1961). Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion applied to all four of the "Blue Law" cases cited in note 50 supra.
57. 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
58. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858), overruled, Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal.
679 (1861) ; see Louisell and Jackson, infra note 66, at 782.
A trial court did enjoin enforcement of certain sections of the Massachusetts Sunday
closing law as unconstitutional, but was reversed in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
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of religious freedom, has become the spokesman for an absolutist interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause.
How is one to explain why so ardent a proponent and so eloquent an ex-
pounder of the American ideal of religious freedom - and when occasion
demanded, so courageous a dissenter - should have been swept away with
the majority to the absolutist viewpoint of establishment? For in Everson v.
Board of Educ.,59 Justice Douglas, although voting with the majority, I think
rightly, to permit reimbursement of bus fares to parents of children attending
nonprofit private and parochial school, unfortunately also acquiesced in the
Court's fateful dictum, which has plagued its path in the religion area ever
since: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can ... aid all religions
.... 60 And when this dictum ripened into holding in McCollum v. Board
of Educ.,61 the Illinois "released time" case with instruction on public school
59. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60. Id. at 15. The full dictum is:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or dis-
beliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16.
61. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In this case an Illinois school board, in accordance with
Illinois law which, of course, also provided for compulsory elementary education, adopted
a program that permitted teachers representing various religious denominations to come
to the school premises. The teachers were paid, not by the school system, but by the
respective denominations. Pursuant to parental approval, the children who wanted the
religious instruction were excused from other studies while the remaining children con-
tinued in their regular secular pursuits. The McCollum child was not allowed by his
parents to attend the religious classes and, as one of the few who remained behind or
went to another room, allegedly suffered embarrassment His parents brought mandamus
to terminate the program, and the Court, by an eight to one vote, condemned the Illinois
plan, deeming it to be an unwarranted use of public property and the compulsory primary
education laws for religious purposes. The Court held the plan was a prohibited "estab-
lishment of religion." Four opinions were written. Mr. Justice Black wrote for the
Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion, in which Justices Jackson,
Rutledge and Burton joined. (Justices Rutledge and Burton also concurred in the Court's
opinion). Mr. Justice Jackson also wrote a concurring opinion. Douglas noted nothing
to indicate dissatisfaction with the Court's opinion. In his AN ALMAfAc OF LIBERTY 261
(1954), he said of McCollum:
The program was held unconstitutional by a divided Court, as "a utilization of
the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups
to spread their faith." The use of the public school rooms and of the public school
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premises, it was with the silent acquiescence of Justice Douglas. Of course,
the error of the extreme "no aid" rationale was not exclusively nor even
explicitly his; it was the error of the Court; but for a man of such outspoken
convictions, silence bespeaks -support for the Court's rationale.
One writes hesitantly of serious error by the Court, especially a lawyer
who respects it as the indispensable condition of our federalism and loves
it as the best protector of our freedom, and who sees in it over its long history
one of the world's great moral teachers. Yet hesitancy would forestall honest
and earnest criticism in vital matters only at the price of cowardice. Such
cowardice is not only inherently shameful but, worse, ultimately destructive
of the prestige and influence of the Court. The rationale of Lincoln's recon-
ciliation, in his First Inaugural, of judicial supremacy with the essentials of
democratic society, has not diminished but rather increased in its pertinency
in the current social scene.62 If the Court is the indispensable brake on the
excesses of democracy, criticism is the essential safety valve for the Court's
own excesses. Without such criticism the viability of a republican tripartite
system is in jeopardy.63 And it is my conviction that the Court's absolutist in-
machinery to help sectarian groups in their religious instruction was the fatal
feature of the scheme.
Mr. Justice Reed in dissent based his opinion primarily on the history of past practices
as authoritatively providing the meaning of "establishment of religion." He noted the
extensive cooperation that government has always given religion in the United States
and concluded that "devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead
us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted
habits of our people." 333 U.S. at 256.
62. 4 BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (1953):
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are
to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be
binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while
they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration, in all parallel cases
by all other departments of the government. And while it is obviously possible
that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following
it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled
and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could
the evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess
that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically
resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there,
in this view, any assault upon the court, or the judges. It is a duty, from which
they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them; and it is no
fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes.
63. Dean Griswold has put well the principles which should govern criticism of
the Court:
An institution charged with the role which the Supreme Court has successfully
filled for so many years is entitled to our respect and understanding. If one criti-
cizes the Court (as people have always done in the past, and should continue
to do in the future), it should be essentially for the purpose of trying to contribute
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terpretation of the Establishment Clause in the dictum in Everson and in the
rationale of, e.g., McCollum, Engel v; Vitale 64 and School Dist. of Abington
v. Schenipp "r is a mistake of major proportions, ranking with several of the
Court's darker moments. 66
For me, Zorach v. Clauson 67 engendered great hope that the Court under
the leadership of Justice Douglas had found its way again. In that, the second
"released time" case, he distinguished McCollum on the ground that there
"classrooms were turned over to religious instructors," whereas in Zorach, the
"released time" plan involved "neither religious instruction in public school
classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds." 68 True, the Zorach opinion
was not fully satisfactory on the latter point, in that Zorach also involved use
of public school machinery existent under compulsory school attendance laws,
and hence some public financing albeit minimal. In fact Mr. Justice Jackson,
dissenting in Zorach, said that the "distinction attempted between [McCollum]
... and [Zorach] ... is trivial, almost to the point of cynicism. . . ." and that
Zorach's "judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of
the judicial process than to students of constitutional law."'6 9
to that respect and to that understanding. The debt which we all owe to the Court
is far greater than any individual can repay. Criticism of decisions of the Court
or opinions of its members should be offered as an effort to repay that debt, and
with the thought that conscientious criticism may be an aid to the Court in carry-
ing out its difficult and essential task.
Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark - A Discussion of The Approach of the Supreme
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167 (1963); see also Freund, The
Supreme Court Under Attack, 25 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1963); cf. Kurland, The School
Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 142, 178 (Oaks ed. 1963).
Respecting criticism from within the Court, the Justice has stated himself:
* * * Short range changes in constitutional doctrine are not unusual, either as a
result of a change in the Bench or a change in the view of the Justices themselves.
And either seems a more honorable, a more frank course than failure to speak
up or the announcement of a constitutional doctrine that a majority disapproves.
Douglas, The Bill of Rights is Not Enough, in THE GREAT RIGHTS, 115, 144 (Cahn ed.
1963).
64. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
65. 374U.S. 203 (1963).
66. In my view this absolutist interpretation is comparable, in its lack of interpreta-
tive accuracy, to Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), corrected ninety-six years
later by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ; it is as unrealistic as Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, affirmance upheld on rehearing 158 U.S.
601 (1895), corrected by the Sixteenth Amendment; it is as inconsistent with the Ameri-
can ethos as Dred Scott's Case, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), reversed by the Civil
War. See Louisell and Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50
CALIF. L. REv. 751, 758 (1962) ; Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 9-22 (1949); Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the
Supreme Court, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 1031, 1052 (1963) ; Sutherland, Establishment Accord-
inq to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REv. 25, 35-39 (1962); but see Cahn, The "Establishment of
Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1274 (1961).
67. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
68. Id. at 308-09.
69. Id. at 325.
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But Zorach's common-sense recognition of the historic realities of American
life, its adjustment of the interests of parts to the whole, and its feel for
meaningful relationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
were gusts of pure air at mountaintop. Crisp and fresh, they dissipate sophistry
and judicial make-believe like "the froth of life that would disappear on the
wings of the northwester on Old Snowy. ' 70 Can anyone, whatever his personal
sentiments and convictions, recall the outpouring of religious feeling and
devotion following the assassination of the President, on occasions private
and public, in churches and chapels, cathedrals and synagogues, shrines and
temples, in homes and on the streets, in village squares and city parks, on
federally licensed radio and television, in grammar schools and universities,
public and private, in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Forces,
wherever the American flag flies, and now on the new Kennedy memorial
coin which still carries the inscription "In God We Trust," without knowing
that in Zorach Douglas truthfully expressed a fundamental of the American
ethos ?
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects
the philosophy that Church and State should be separated .... The First
Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines
the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union
or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter.
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly.71
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses .... When the
state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious au-
thorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions .... To hold that it may not would be
to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may
not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend
secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one
or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional require-
ment which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion
and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of
religious influence. 72
But the hopes engendered by Zorach that the Court again was on a track
strong enough to sustain the heavy freight of the religious issues, and at
70. DOUGLAS, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS 212 (1950).
71. 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
72. Id. at 313-14; see RELIGioN AND ANMERICAN SOCIETY 40 (Fund for the Republic,
1961). In his AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 298 (1954), Justice Douglas said of Zorach:
The First Amendment does not require the state and the churches to be aliens
to each other. Policemen can help parishioners into their churches, prayers can
be said in legislatures, Thanksgiving Day can be proclaimed, "So help me God"
can be used in the courtroom without violating the First Amendment.
See also DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 338 (1956).
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least heading in the direction of wise decisions, were frustrated by its rationale
in Engel v. Vitale,73 the New York Regents Prayer Case. There absolutist
notions of the meaning of the Establishment Clause carried the principle that
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can pass laws which ...
aid all religions"'74 almost to logic's ultimate limits in the Court's rationale,
and certainly so in the concurrence of Justice Douglas. Perhaps the Zorach-
born hopes were too sanguine; in any event perhaps one should have been
forewarned by Torcaso v. Watkins 75 "no aid" to religion formula, in which
justice Douglas again silently acquiesced. In that case the Court apparently
equated for all First Amendment purposes theistic and nontheistic religions.
Thereby the Court - since on its own premise government cannot aid any
or all religion - logically had placed secular humanism's tenet of Human
Brotherhood as much beyond the pale for the classroom as the principles of
the Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of Man in the Jewish and Christian
traditions - leaving public schools without any philosophical basis for in-
culcating values.76
Perhaps therefore the Court's rationale in Engel was to have been antici-
pated; perhaps one should be reconciled that an error of this kind often takes
at least a generation to correct. But what of Justice Douglas' concurrence -
especially in the light of Zorach's "We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being"? For in his Engel concurring opinion, he would
root out apparently every vestige, direct and indirect, of religion in public
affairs. He would hold unconstitutional, as an establishment of religion, each
of the ways in which our government, federal and state, is "honeycombed"
73. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
74. This dictum first appeared in Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), was quoted in
McCollum, 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948), was partially paraphrased in Zorach, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952), and was quoted again in Torcaso 7Y. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961).
There seemed to be a gleam of hope in the fact of its omission from Engel; see Louisell
and Jackson, supra note 66, at 760 n.38. But it was quoted again in Abington, 374 U.S.
203, 216 (1963). When the current "no aid" notion is superseded by a realistic accommo-
dation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, accordant with the historic
paramountcy of religious freedom, much credit will be due Mr. Justice Stewart, who
stood ground for reason and history in his dissents in Engel, 370 U.S. 421, 444 (1962),
and Abington, 374 U.S. at 308. See also his opinion concurring in the result in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963). He stood alone in Engel and Abington; but so did
Justice (later Chief Justice) Stone in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
601 (1940) (first flag-salute case), overruled, West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (second flag-salute case). Moreover, once again there
is hope in the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Goldberg in Abington, 374
U.S. at 230, 305, that the most extreme threats implicit in the "no aid" notion - and
made explicit by Douglas in his Engel concurrence, 370 U.S. at 437 - will bow to the
realities of American history.
75. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Of course no issue is taken with the holding of the Court
that the Free Exercise Clause precludes a religious test as a qualification for public office.
The objectionable thing was the invoking, 367 U.S. at 492-93, of the rigid "no aid" to
religion formula first stated in Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
76. See Louisell and Jackson, supra note 66, at 759; Kauper, supra note 66, at 1054.
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with financing of religious exercises.77 Borrowing another's words, he paraded
a long list of activities that should be banned. Even a partial recapitulation of
the federal activities he mentioned is imposing:78 chaplains in both Houses
of Congress and in the armed services; compulsory chapel at the service
academies; religious proclamations by the President; use of the Bible for
oaths; funds for the education of veterans at denominational schools, and for
lunches for children in such schools; the references to God on coins and in
the pledge of allegiance; Bible reading in the schools of the District of Columbia
(its removal has now been ordered in state schools by Abington School Dist.
v. Sche~npp) ;79 taxation exemption for religious organizations; deductions
for income tax purposes of contributions to religious organizations.
How would such a banning as this comport with being "a religious people"
whose needs as such - so Zorach taught - were to be accommodated by the
state? In'trying to answer such a question, one must strive mightily to be
fair. Certainly concurrence in the Court's actual conclusion in Engel could
have been consistent with Zorach's rationale. If Justice Douglas had con-
cluded, after deliberate appraisal of the facts with appropriate deference to
the on-the-spot fact finders,80 that public school prayer for young children is
so inherently coercive as to violate the free exercise of religion, an opinion
so proclaiming might have matched in reasonableness what he said in Barnette
or Ballard or Girouard, and in eloquence the thoughts that came to him on
the mountaintop. Moreover, let us assume that it is possible analytically to
harmonize with Zorach even a concurrence in the Court's Establishment Clause
rationale in Engel, at least to the extent it is grounded in the notion of pro-
hibited governmental financing of religion. For, after all, the hub of the Doug-
las complaint about Engel's practices, repeated in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, concerns their financing by government; and conceivably he thought
such financing in Engel, albeit small, was more significant than in Zorach. Or
perhaps in the Justice's concept, the financing in Zorach, unlike that in Engel.
was "indirect" as apparently he thought it to be in Sherbert v. Verner,8 ' which
77. 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962).
78. Id. at 437 n.1, quoting FELLMAN, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM~f 40-41 (1959).
79. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
80. Cf. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? - The School Prayer Cases, 1963
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1, 30 (1963).
81. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (concurring opinion). It is, however, indeed difficult
to see how the teacher's leading of the prayer in Engel is any more a financing of religion
than the teacher's activities in Zorach connected with release of students for religious
instruction. In fact, in Engel Justice Douglas himself stressed that only a bare fraction
of the teacher's time was given to the 22-word Regents' prayer. 370 U.S. 421, 441 (1962).
Of course, if a reasonable balancing of values and interests were permitted, it would
be relevant to suggest that the felt need for religious instruction plus the Free Exercise
Clause's guarantees countervailed in Zorach against the relatively slight involvement of
public financing; whereas even the slight financing involved in Engel, plus at least the
possibility of psychological coercion of dissenting children, outweighs the majority's right
to pray. But any such reasonable balancing is the very thing precluded by the absolutist
"no aid" formulal
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held the free exercise of religion to be denied when unemployment benefits
were withheld because of a religiously-based refusal to work on Saturday. But
in any event, however much one juggles the contingencies, it is impossible
honestly to acquit Justice Douglas of gross inconsistency. For however recon-
cilable his votes in Zorach and the subsequent cases, the fact remains that the
raison d'etre for Zorach's accommodation between public and religious inter-
ests was that "Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other
- hostile, suspicious and even unfriendly. '8 2 As he said in Zorach, but for
such accommodation
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection
to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places
of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative
halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive;
the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me God"
in our courtroom oaths - these and all other references to the Almighty
that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be
flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could
even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session:
"God save the United States and this Honorable Court.' 8 3
But those very things which in Zorach he saw as indispensable to accommoda-
tion of the religious needs of the people, in Engel he would obliterate. All as-
pects of religion in public life he would now hold unconstitutional, for the
same reason he condemned the New York Regents' prayer.
In New York the teacher who leads in prayer is on the public payroll;
and the time she takes seems minuscule as compared with the salaries
appropriated by state legislature and Congress for chaplains to conduct
prayers in the legislative halls. Only a bare fraction of the teacher's time
is given to reciting this short 22-word prayer ["Almighty God, we ac-
knowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."], about the same amount
of time our Crier spends announcing the opening of our sessions and
offering a prayer for this Court. Yet for me the principle is the same,
no matter how briefly the prayer is said, for in each of the instances given
the person praying is a public official on the public payroll, performing
a religious exercise in a governmental institution. It is said that the
element of coercion is inherent in the giving of this prayer. If that is
true here, it is also true of the prayer with which this Court is convened,
and of those that open the Congress. Few adults, let alone children, would
leave our courtroom or the Senate or the House while those prayers are
being given. Every such audience is in a sense a "captive" audience.
At the same time I cannot say that to authorize this prayer is to es-
tablish a religion in the strictly historic meaning of those words. A religion
is not established in the usual sense merely by letting those who choose
to do so say the prayer that the public school teacher leads.8 4
How can one explain such a volte-face? Has there been a true change of
conviction, a belief that what he once thought to be constitutionally permissible
82. 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
83. Id. at 312-13.
84. 370 U.S. 421, 441-42 (1962).
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- even required - by way of accommodation of the religious needs of the
people, he now sees as an unconstitutional financing of religion? If so, one
would expect an explicit acknowledgement of the change accordant with
Douglas' usual directness and candor. Far from such an acknowledgement,
Zorach's "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being" is repeated in the Engel concurring opinion,8 5 but without mention of
those essential accommodations specified in Zorach as the natural consequences
of that philosophy. Instead there is substituted without meaningful elucidation
the vapid statement, "The First Amendment leaves the Government in a
position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality."' 6
The Engel concurrence does, however, contain one explicit recantation;
Justice Douglas there regretted his vote in Everson, which made the majority
of only five who permitted reimbursement to parents of bus money spent for
children attending nonprofit private and parochial schools. He says in Engel:
The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First
Amendment. Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy
children. Yet by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy
other needs of children in parochial schools - lunches, books, and tuition
being obvious examples.87
The foregoing illustrates how an interpretation of the Establishment Clause
"not only insensitive, but positively wooden"8 accords it "a meaning which
neither the words, the history, nor the intention of the authors of that specific
constitutional provision even remotely suggests"89 and works at the end, as
even well-intentioned absolutism so often does, to undermine freedom.90
85. Id. at 442.
86. Id. at 443.
87. Ibid. But see Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), hold-
ing that Louisiana did not violate due process by spending state funds for school books
in parochial as well as public schools; the First Amendment freedoms were not discussed.
88. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
89. Ibid.
90. "Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because
doctrines get inside of a man's reason and betray him against himself." W. G. Sumner,
quoted in Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962). Compare Mr. Justice Black:
I have no doubt myself that the ... [First Amendment], as written and adopted,
intended that there should be no libel or defamation law in the United States under
the United States Government, just absolutely none so far as I am concerned.
.* * [T]he same rule should apply to the states.
Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
549, 557-58 (1962), with Lincoln's:
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty .... We all declare
for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing .... The
shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the
shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the de-
stroyer of liberty....
Address at a Saiitary Fair in Baltimore, April 18, 1864 in BASLER, ABRAHA-m LINCOLN:
His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 748-49 (1946). To make the contrast pertinent, may one
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Shortly after McCollum the contention was seriously made that because gov-
ernment cannot establish a religion, it cannot permit a religious group to use
a public park.91 And now, in the name of the Establishment Clause, as staunch
a friend of religious liberty as Justice Douglas - who in Barnette insisted
on resting his vote against the compulsory flag salute on the significance of
the religiously predicated conscience - seems prepared to deny parochial
school children such public benefits as transportation, lunches and books even
though the reason for their school attendance is a religiously predicated
conscience.
9 2
A cynic might see in all of this nothing but disappointed ambitions, and
point out that Zorach was decided before the Democratic National Convention
of 1952 had foreclosed the last reasonable hope of the Presidency - before
the Presidential bug had lost its bite. Others may play the psychoanalyst to
see in the self-contradictions of Douglas only repercussions of the stresses
justifiably think of "wolf" as today's libeller (emboldened by an absolutist interpretation
of the First Amendment), and "shepherd" as our law of libel?
91. Milwaukee County v. Carter, 258 Wis. 139, 45 N.W.2d 90 (1950). But the
holding was that the guarantee of free exercise of religion precludes an ordinance pro-
hibiting religious activity in a public park. In County of Los Angeles v. Hollinger, 200
Cal. App. 2d 877, 19 Cal. Rptr. 648 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), the producer of Verdi's opera
Nabucodonosor (popularly "Nabucco") with an Old Testament theme, had to get a
court order for payment of the contract price, the auditor having declined payment
because of a suggestion that the contract aided religion.
92. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Justice Douglas faced again what
seems to me essentially the same problem in a different guise. There the Court under
the Free Exercise Clause compelled South Carolina to pay unemployment compensation
benefits to an employee whose unavailability for Saturday work resulted from her re-
ligious convictions as a Sabbatarian (although, admittedly, unavailability for such work
for other reasons would have justified nonpayment). The deference for the widest range
of religious conviction evidenced in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion is reminiscent
of the best in his protection of religious liberty, and logically would seem to imply that,
after all, his vote in Everson was right. There is, however, this ambiguous paragraph
which urges a test that is merely mechanical and therefore discordant with the earthy
realism which so often characterizes his writing:
This case is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can demand of
government, but solely in terms of what government may not do to an individual
in violation of his religious scruples. The fact that government cannot exact from
me a surrender of one iota of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean
that I can demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them.
For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot
do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
government.
374 U.S. at 412. And his concurring opinion in Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 227, esp. 229
(1963), contains language about the significance of financing almost as extreme as his
Engel language. Abinzgton and Sherbert were decided the same day, June 17, 1963. Also
he voted to grant certiorari in Abernethy v. City of Irvine, 355 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1962)
(a lease of a hospital building to a religious community of Benedictine Sisters does not
constitute the transfer of public property to a religious organization in violation of the
First Amendment), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831 (1962).
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inherent in man's predicament.93 But I am neither cynic nor psychoanalyst,
and I like to think that I see the truth seeker on the mountaintop, indifferent
to his public image, willing to be "naked and alone, judged by the harmony
of his soul, by his spiritual strength, by the purity of his heart."0 4 Perhaps
from the depths of a personality instinctively truthful the Justice has been
trying to tell his brethren and all of us:
You cannot have it both ways. You cannot have your cake and eat it
too. Either we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being, or we are not. If to let "those who want to say a prayer
say it" is Establishment of Religion, 5 let us not be hypocritical but truth-
ful to the end. If government cannot give any aid to religion, let us forth-
rightly put an end to all such aid. If we really mean "no aid" to religion,
let us adhere to "no aid." I will show you the truth by logic's most violent
device - reductio ad absurdum. On this I shall dissent as long as I am
here, until you face the truth.9 6
In religion, as elsewhere in life, each generation produces its own special
questions and answers. Theology's emphasis at any moment is a function of
the current chief mischief. Today's theological emphasis is on love, not truth.
Perhaps this helps explain why the truth seeker is not particularly idealized
today. He is apt to be thought of as too much of a Savonarola for a tolerant
93. Is the weariness his writing .sometimes now indicates but the reaction of any
thinking man today who contrasts what so many religious people say with what they
do? In his "Blue Law" dissent he borrows from John Cogley to say:
For the foreseeable future, it seems, the United States is going to be a three-
religion nation. At the present time all three are characteristically "America,"
some think flavorlessly so. For religion in America is almost uniformly "respecta-
ble," bourgeois, and prosperous. In the Protestant world the "church" mentality
has triumphed over the more venturesome spirit of the "sect." In the Catholic
world, the mystical is muted in favor of booming organization and efficiently
administered good works. .And in the Jewish world the prophet is too frequently
without honor, while the synagogue emphasis is focused in suburban togetherness.
There are exceptions to these rules, of course; each of the religious communities
continues to cast up its prophets, its rebels and radicals. But a Jeremiah, one
fears, would be positively embarrassing to the present position of the Jews; a
Francis of Assisi upsetting the complacency of American Catholics would be
rudely dismissed as a fanatic; and a Kierkegaard, speaking with an American
accent, would be considerably less welcome than Norman Vincent Peale in most
Protestant pulpits.
366 U.S. at 565-66.
94. DouGLAs, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS 211 (1950).
95. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
96. His language concurring in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 393, 411-12 (1963),
is pertinent:
Some have thought that a majority of the community can, through state action,
compel a minority to observe their particular religious scruples so long as the
majority's rule can be said to perform some valid secular function. That was the
essence of the Court's decision in the Sunday Blue Law Cases [note 56, supra], a
ruling from which I then dissented . . . and still dissent.
See Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962); and text accompanying
notes 57 .ipra and 102 infra.
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age. It seems that our generation appreciates the truth seeker as little as
another generation did the prophet. Perhaps it is as a reaction to the venom
of hatred that has so freely coursed in society's veins since that fateful
Summer, 1914, that today we insist on love as religion's ultimate desideratum. 9
Thus we are often reminded:
And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of
these is charity.98
Religion pure and undefiled before God the Father is this: to give aid
to orphans and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted
from this world.99
Indeed, the justice's own compendious travel books so abundantly document
a philosophy of sympathy for mankind in its predicament, that for him, too,
perhaps charity is the ultimate religious principle.1,0
But love, over the long pull of the human experience, has competitors for
the first place. One competitor is truth. For we are also told, "You shall
know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."' 01 Perhaps for mortals
the seeking after truth is as much - dare one say even more? - a part of
the Kingdom of Heaven than loving. And maybe truth, in an affluent and
blas6 society, can only be noticed if it is proclaimed unceasingly, blatantly,
even violently.
Is it, then, as truth seeker that Justice Douglas comes to what for me is
an absurd - a violently absurd - result in Arlan's °?102 For he there condemns
Sunday laws even when they protect the conscience of the dissenter. But
absurd though this result be (and his eight colleagues dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question), is it not the truth which he proclaims when he
says: "The religious nature of this state regulation [prohibition of Sunday
employment] is emphasized by the fact that it exempts 'members of a religious
society' who actually observe the Sabbath on a day other than Sunday. The
97. See, e.g., DARcy, THE MIND AND HEART OF LovE 9-10 (1947).
98. 1 Corinthians 13:13 (King James).
99. 1 James 27 (Confraternity).
100. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE 232-33 (1951); DOUGLAS,
BEYOND THE HIGH HmIL.AYAS 197 (1952) ; DOUGLAS, NORTH FROm MALAYA 248 (1953) ;
DOUGLAS, WEST OF THE INDUS 375-85 (1958). See also DOUGLAS, AmERicA CHALLENGED
passim (1960) ; DOUGLAS, DEmOCRACY'S MANIFESTO passim (1962). In DOUGLAS, RUSSIAN
JOURNEY 206-07 (1956), he tells of being invited by a Russian priest to share the pulpit,
and delivering the sermon:
I took as my text the words printed on the streamer over the pulpit: "God is
Love," 1 John 4:16 [King James]. I told these Russian peasants and workers
that we in America worshipped the same God they worshipped.... The words of
Christ were our common inspiration. We worshipped through Him the same God.
... The gospel according to John is "That he who loveth God love his brother
also."
101. John 8:32 (Confraternity).
102. 371 U.S. 218 (1962) ; see text accompanying notes 57 and 96 supra.
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law is thus plainly an aid to all organized religions.. .,u03 May not ultimately
there be in this kind of mountaintop-like candor that coerces proclamation of
truth, more real hope for a modus vivendi in the dilemma of American religious
pluralism, than in judicial make-believe such as that Sunday laws are secular?
"Old Snowy has no deceit or cunning .... It is as genuine and as impartial
as the northwester."' 0 4
Perhaps, then, there is in Douglas on Religious Freedom something of an
exegesis of what has always been for me the most troublesome, baffling and
mystifying message in the Holy Bible:
And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of
heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away. 05
103. 371 U.S. at 220 (italics added).
104. DOUGLAS, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS 209 (1950).
105. Matthew 11:12 (Douay).
About the time of the Justice's appointment, I was invited by colleagues in practice
in New York to a Yale banquet honoring him. It was a gala occasion, resplendent with
wine and wit. As I recall, the Justice's remarks largely consisted of reading verses that
were more or less spontaneously passed up to him. There must have been something
about the way he read them - his capacity to distill the genuine from the trivial - that
has enabled me to remember one to this day, more than twenty-five years later:
Mr. Justice, will you rule
The way you always used to drool?
Wesley Sturges says you will,
But my advice is, - Easy, Bill !
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